are nonfluent aphasic patients who appear to have selective problems with abstract words on a variety of standard tests. Such a pattern would normally be interpreted as indicating a central semantic deficit for abstract words. The authors show that this is not the case by means of a semantic priming task, which tests for implicit knowledge of the meanings of abstract and concrete words. Spoken word pairs that were either abstract or concrete synonyms (e.g., street-road or luck-chance) were presented, and it was found that both patients showed priming for the abstract and concrete pairs. The researchers followed up by asking the patients to produce definitions to spoken abstract and concrete words; these definitions were also normal. The priming and definition data suggest that the semantic representations of abstract words in these patients were relatively unimpaired. The researchers found that the patients have problems only with spoken abstract words in just those tasks where normal controls also have difficulty. In contrast, they clearly have deficits in reading abstract words aloud, which may be due to problems with output phonology. The implications of these data for claims concerning hemispheric differences in the representation of abstract and concrete words are discussed.
, and in various comprehension tasks (Franklin, 1989; Franklin, Howard, & Patterson, 1994) . 2 When dissociations of this type are encountered-where performance on one type of word (e.g., concrete words) is relatively better than on another type of word (e.g., abstract words) and where this pattern holds across different input and output modalities-it is assumed that this reflects an impairment in the representation (rather than the access) of abstract words. On this kind of view, a selective impairment of abstract words arises because their underlying representation differs from that of concrete words. In other words, abstract and concrete words are qualitatively different from each other; they constitute different categories. Thus, the abstract word impairment is similar to a category-specific impairment where one specific category of knowledge is selectively impaired following brain damage.
In this article, we explore the nature of the abstract word deficit in 2 aphasic patients-J.G. and D.E.-who on tests that are standardly used to assess the comprehension of abstract words score very poorly. They both have considerable difficulty reading abstract words compared with concrete words, and their auditory comprehension of abstract words, as measured by a word-picture matching task, is also impaired. When a patient shows impaired performance on abstract words in both the auditory and visual modalities, it is usually interpreted in terms of a central semantic deficit for abstract words rather than a modality-specific access impairment. The question we address in this article is whether this is indeed the case. Do J.G. and D.E. have a deficit in the semantic representation of abstract words even though the representation of concrete words remains unimpaired?
First of all, we will present the patient reading and wordpicture data that support the claim that they have selective problems with abstract words in both modalities. Then we describe a semantic priming study, in which we contrast priming for abstract and concrete words and a definition study.
J.G. and D.E.: Evidence for Selective Problems With
Abstract Words
In 1977, Patterson and Marcel reported reading data on D.E. in which he was 70% accurate on reading concrete words compared with 10% accuracy on abstract words. Although comparable data have not been reported for J.G., both patients have been classified as "deep dyslexics" and "agrammatics" (Byng, 1988; Ostrin & Tyler, 1994; Patterson & Marcel, 1977; Tyler Ostrin, Cooke, & Moss, 1995) .
In 1993, we examined J.G. and D.E.'s ability to read a matched set of abstract and concrete words. These were a subset of the words used in the semantic priming study that we report below. D.E. read 100% of the concrete words accurately but only 55% of the abstract ones. On the same set of words, J.G. read 90% of the concrete words correctly and 45% of the abstract ones. Both patients showed similar problems when comprehending spoken abstract words. In a word-picture matching task (Shallice & McGill, personal communication, 1978) where they had to match a spoken word to one of four alternatives, both patients made substantially more errors on abstract words than on concrete words. D.E. made 3% errors on the concrete words and 33% on the abstract words; J.G. made 10% errors on the concrete words and 50% on the abstract words.
On the basis of these data, one would typically conclude that brain damage had caused selective damage to the semantic representations of abstract words and had left the representation of concrete words relatively intact. However, the picture for J.G. and D.E. is not as clear as it at first appears. Although it is uncontroversial that they are more impaired at reading abstract than concrete words, in that their performance is much worse than that of any control participant for the abstract set, the interpretation of the word-picture matching data is not so straightforward when the patients' performance is compared with the range of 8 elderly education-matched controls. Although the patients are clearly impaired on abstract words when we compare them with the mean of the group performance (5.2% errors for concrete words and 10% errors for abstract words), it is different when we look at the range of errors produced by the controls: 1-7% for concrete words and 0-33% for abstract words. Some of the controls performed very poorly indeed on abstract words, suggesting that the task can be very difficult even for those who have not suffered brain damage. This is probably because of the nature of the words themselves-most of the abstract words were morphologically complex (e.g., supplication or democracy), of low frequency, and difficult to represent in picture form.
Thus, when we compare the patients with the range of normal performance, as opposed to the mean, the interpretation of the patient data changes. Although J.G. is outside the normal range, his performance is worse than that of the controls on both abstract and concrete words. Moreover D.E.'s performance on both abstract and concrete words is within the normal range. This raises the issue as to whether these patients do indeed suffer from differential impairment in the semantic representation of abstract as opposed to concrete words or whether they simply do worse on more difficult tasks.
Thus, the data for J.G. and D.E. do not present unequivocal evidence that they have a selective representational deficit for abstract words. Although there is no doubt that they are seriously impaired in their ability to read abstract words, the word-picture matching data do not conclusively establish that they have comparable problems with abstract words when they are spoken. Thus, the possibility remains that the representation of abstract words may be relatively intact in these patients, but the ability to access them through the written modality might be impaired.
Present Studies
To determine whether the patients are able to access the meaning of abstract words when they are spoken, we used the semantic priming task (Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971) . The advantage of this type of task is that it avoids some of the problems involved in the word-picture matching task, such as the difficulty of trying to represent in a picture form, abstract words that are inherently difficult to picture (e.g., supplication) .
Another advantage of the priming task is that it taps into implicit knowledge about a word's meaning (Cherktow, Bub, & Seidenberg, 1989; Moss, Ostrin, Tyler, & Marslen-Wilson, 1994; . This is in contrast to tasks like word-picture matching, which require the participant to consciously reflect on semantic knowledge and semantic relations. Research has shown that this distinction between explicit and implicit knowledge is an important one for many aphasic patients, with implicit knowledge often being preserved even when explicit access to it is impaired (e.g., Chenery, Ingram, & Murdoch, 1990; Moss, Tyler, Hodges, & Patterson, 1995; Milberg & Blumstein, 1981; Patterson & Marcel, 1977; Tyler, 1992; Tyler, Ostrin, Cooke, & Moss, 1994). 3 In one type of semantic priming task, patients are auditorily presented with pairs of words and asked to make a lexical decision to the second member of the pair. 4 When the pairs are semantically related (e.g., broom-floor) auditory lexical decision latencies are faster than when the pairs are unrelated (book-floor). We know from previous studies with J.G. and 3 The same distinction between preserved implicit and impaired explicit knowledge following brain damage has been observed in other cognitive domains. 4 There has recently been considerable dispute over the appropriate methodology to use in a priming task where the aim is to tap into automatic activation of semantic information. Shelton and Martin (1992) claimed that the paired presentation technique encourages controlled, strategic processes to come into play and therefore is not a good measure of automatic processes. However, Moss, Ostrin, Tyler, & Marslen-Wilson (1994) have questioned these claims in a number of studies, and therefore we continue to use the paired presentation with patients. Moreover, the 2 patients we discuss in the present article-D.E. and J.G.-have been tested on both the paired and single-word presentation method and they showed identical (and essentially normal) patterns of priming in the two tasks.
D.E. that they show normal priming for concrete words (Ostrin & Tyler, 1993; Tyler et al., 1995) . In the Tyler et al. (1995) study, we examined priming for a set of familiar concrete nouns for a range of different types of semantic relationshipincluding category coordinates (cat-dog or pig-horse) and functional relations (hammer-nail or broom-floor). Half of the pairs were strongly associated (as determined by association norms; e.g., gold-silver), and half were purely semantically related and not associated at all (e.g., copper-tin). Both unimpaired controls and patients showed priming for the associated and nonassociated pairs, and the lexical decision latencies of both patients were within the normal range, as was the proportion of priming they showed across a wide range of semantic relationships. On the basis of these results, we claimed that the semantic representations of concrete words were unimpaired for J.G. and D.E. 5 The issue that we address in the present study is whether they also show normal priming for abstract words.
On the assumption that the semantic priming task taps into automatic access to underlying semantic representations, then if J.G. and D.E. have impairments in the central semantic representation of abstract words, they should not show normal priming for these words. 6 If they do, then this suggests that the central semantic representations of abstract words are relatively intact. We could then attribute their difficulties with abstract words to impairments in the processes involved in accessing the semantic representations of abstract words, especially in the visual modality.
In addition to the priming data, we also obtained another type of data about the meaning of abstract and concrete words from the patients. Some weeks after completing the priming experiment, we asked the patients to provide definitions for a set of abstract and concrete words. Providing definitions for words is one of the most straightforward ways of determining how much a person knows about the meaning of a word. Of course, given that both J.G. and D.E. have severe production problems, if they cannot define a word, we cannot be sure that this means that they do not know what it means. But, if they can provide a coherent definition of a word, then this is evidence that they retain knowledge of the word's meaning.
Method

Materials
In this experiment, we selected pairs of words that were semantically related. Half of the pairs were concrete, and the other half were abstract. In addition, because of the controversy over whether associative and semantic relations are qualitatively different from each other (Fischler, 1977; Moss et al., 1994) , we also controlled for associative strength such that half of the pairs within the sets of abstract and concrete pairs were highly associated, and the other half were not. If pairs of words that are not highly associated prime each other, this cannot be accounted for on the basis of lexical connections; such priming must arise from semantic relationships between the word pairs.
This generated four sets of test stimuli: (a) concrete words that were semantically and associatively related (+A + S); (b) concrete words that were semantically but not associatively related (-A + S); (c) abstract words that were both semantically and associatively related Note. Familiarity, Concreteness, and imageability are rated on a scale from 1 to 7 (Coltheart, 1981) . Mean frequency per million words (Hofland & Johansson, 1982) .
(+A + S); and (d) abstract words that were semantically but not associatively related (-A + S).
Abstract Words
We initially conducted a dictionary search for pairs of abstract words that were (a) semantically related but not associated (e.g., causereason) and (b) both semantically and associatively related (e.g., courage-bravery). These were subjected to two pretests. The semantic relatedness pretest was carried out to obtain objective assessments of the extent to which each pair was semantically related. For this pretest, related pairs were mixed with unrelated filler pairs in a written list. We asked 15 controls to rate each pair on a scale of 1-9, where 9 was very related and 1 was very unrelated. Only pairs of words with a mean rating of more than 7 were counted as semanticaily related. The semantically unrelated pairs received a mean rating of less than 3. The association norm pretest was designed to determine associative strength of the word pairs either from existing norms (Moss & Older, 1994; Postman & Keppel, 1970) or from an association pretest. In this test, 40 participants were presented with written lists of words and asked to write down the first word they thought of for each word. A word pair was deemed to be highly associated if it had an associative strength of over 19%.
Then we selected sets of items that were matched for frequency (Hofland & Johansson, 1982) , familiarity, Concreteness, and imageability 7 (Coltheart, 1981) . This yielded 22 word pairs in each of the two conditions. The relevant statistics for the selected word pairs in the two conditions are given in Table 1 .
Concrete Words
As for the abstract words, we initially searched the dictionary for relevant concrete word pairs. Then we determined strength of associative and semantic relationship by means of the same pretests described above. As a result of these pretests, we obtained 22 items in each of the two conditions: (a) pairs that were both semantically and associatively related (street-road); (b) pairs that were semantically but not associatively related (stick-cane). The statistics of these two sets of items are given in Table 2 .
As Tables 1 and 2 show, the + Associative/+Semantic and -Associative/-(-Semantic conditions are well matched on all of the relevant variables for the abstract and concrete words.
Control Words
Each test target was paired with an unrelated prime to act as a baseline for lexical decision. Unrelated primes were produced by repairing each target word with another prime in the same condition, which was semantically, associatively, and phonologically unrelated to the target. The syllable length of the control prime was matched to that of the test prime.
Filler Items
Word^word fillers. The test and control items produced an item set consisting of 88 pairs, where half of the word pairs were related and half unrelated in each version. These were mixed with 22 associatively related concrete pairs that were the stimuli for another experiment and acted as filler items in the present experiment.
To reduce the proportion of related word pairs in each version to approximately one fourth of the real words and 12% of the entire set we constructed 88 word-word filler items that were semantically, associatively, and phonologically unrelated.
8 These filler items matched the test items in terms of syllable length. This made a total of 198 test, control, and word-word fillers.
Word-Nonwordfillers. We added 198 word-nonword fillers to each version so that there was an equal probability of encountering a real-word or nonword target. All the word-nonword pairs were phonologically unrelated. The prime words and nonword targets contained the same proportion of syllable lengths as the test, control, and word-word filler pairs. The nonwords were phonologically legal and not pseudo-homophones (e.g., hiction and blave). Note. Familiarity, concreteness, and imageability are rated on a scale from 1 to 7 (Coltheart, 1981) . Mean frequency per million words (Hofland & Johansson, 1982) .
Procedure Priming Task
The test items, word-word fillers, and word-nonword fillers were randomized. So that no target word would appear twice in a single session, two versions of the materials were made with items in each condition fully counterbalanced over versions. The test items appeared in the same position as their controls in each version. We also constructed 40 practice pairs similar in their properties to the items used in the experiment.
The materials were recorded by a female native British English speaker in a sound-attenuated booth. They were then digitized onto computer hard disk at a sampling rate of 20 kHz. The experiment was controlled by the computer that played the speech token out directly from the stored wave forms and registered participant responses.
Each trial consisted of a spoken pair of words separated by an interstimulus interval of 200 ms. Participants made a lexical decision to the second (target) item in the pair. Lexical decision responses were measured from the onset of the target word.
Definition Task
Two months after completing the priming study, each patient carried out the definition task. For this task, we constructed a mixed list consisting of 22 abstract words and 24 concrete words. The mean frequency of the abstract and concrete words was 74 (SD = 96) and 70 (SD = 88), respectively. The mean familiarity ratings of each set was 546 (SD = 57) and 553 (SD = 50), and their mean concreteness ratings were 276 (SD = 38) and 586 (SD = 34). The abstract words were taken from the present priming study, and the concrete words were taken from an earlier study that had produced robust priming in both patients . The words were presented auditorily to the participants, and their spoken responses were recorded.
Participants Patients
D.E. is a right-handed man who suffered brain damage in 1970 at the age of 16 following a motor scooter accident. He received a CAT scan in 1978 that showed a large left hemisphere lesion involving the middle and posterior parts of the frontal lobe and most of the temporal lobe. He has moderate right hemiplegia. He left school at 16 and has worked as a storekeeper since his accident. On the Boston Diagnostic Aphasia Examination, he was classified as an agrammatic Broca's aphasic; see Tyler (1992) for additional details.
J.G., who is also right-handed, suffered a left temporo-parietal cerebrovascular accident in November 1980 when he was 55 years old, resulting in the absence of any active metabolism in his left hemisphere as determined by PET scan (Hinton, Plaut, & Shallice, 1993) . He has dense right-sided hemiplegia, such that he is unable to use his right arm. J.G. left school at 15 years and was employed as a groundsman for 30 years until the time of his stroke. On the basis of the BDAE, he was 8 A low relatedness proportion is necessary to ensure that the participant does not become aware of the semantic relationship between the words. This is one of the important criteria in ensuring that the priming task picks up the automatic activation of semantic information (Neely, 1991; Tweedy, Lapinski, & Schvaneveldt, 1977) .
classified as an agraramatic Broca's aphasic; see Tyler (1992) for additional details.
Controls
In addition to testing J.G. and D.E., we also tested a group of 7 elderly men and women (mean age = 69 years; range = 63-75). The controls were tested in the same way as the patients; that is, they were tested on both versions of the priming materials with 1 month separating the two testing sessions. They also participated in the definitions task 2 months after completing the priming study.
Results
Priming Study
Control participants. The data from the 7 controls were entered into two analyses of variance (ANOVAs)-one with participants and the other with items as the random variable. Of the data 0.8% was removed because of lexical decision error. Of the remaining data, 4.8% exceeded 2 SDs from the mean and were replaced by the 2 SD cutoff value. The mean reaction times (RTs) for the four conditions are given in Table  3 , together with the mean proportion of priming 9 and the range of priming shown by the participants.
There was a significant effect of priming, Fi(l, 6) = 100.76, p < .001; F 2 (l, 80) = 74.91, p < .001, with lexical decision latencies to targets being significantly faster when they were preceded by a related prime (865 ms) than when they were preceded by an unrelated prime (937 ms). There was a main effect of association, F,(l, 6) = 23.99, p < .001; F 2 (l, 80) = 7.34,p < .01, with RTs being faster in the associated (845 ms) than the semantic conditions (926 ms), but the interaction between association and priming was not significant, Fj(l, 6) = 0.084, p = .78; F 2 (l, 80) = 0.129, p = .72; the amount of priming was similar for pairs that were associatively related (74 ms) and those that were not (69 ms). Moreover, association did not interact with the abstract-concrete variable, Fj(l, 6) = 0.195,p = .67; F 2 (l, 80) = .065,p = .8. In general, there tended to be more priming for concrete pairs (91 ms) than for abstract (52 ms) pairs Fj(l, 6) = 4.905, p = .069; F 2 (l, 80) = 5.623, p = .02. Looking at the four groups of stimuli separately, we found some variation in the range of priming effects (see Table 3 ). However, when the variable of association was collapsed, all controls showed robust priming for the concrete words (proportion of priming ranged between 5% and 13%). For the abstract words, 2 of the controls showed minimal priming (3%), but the other 5 controls showed robust priming of between 7% and Given that there was some degree of variation in the concreteness ratings for the words within the concrete set, we carried out a subsequent analysis to determine whether the amount of priming increased with higher concreteness rating. We entered amount of priming and concreteness rating for the concrete set into a correlational analysis and found no effect of concreteness on amount of priming (r = .085, p = .584). 12 These and the corresponding data points were removed from the analysis; 6.8% were extreme values (i.e., they exceeded 2 SDs from the mean) and were replaced by the cutoff value (M ± 2 SDs,)." The means for each condition are given in Table 4 . As can be seen in the table, J.G.'s lexical decision latencies are well within the normal range of 760-1,073 ms.
J.G.'s data was entered into an ANOVA. He showed a significant effect of priming overall,F,(l, 71) = 50.46,/? = .001, with mean latencies of 732 ms to target words following related Note. A = associated; S = semantic. 'Significant at p < .05 or beyond. 9 The proportion of priming is calculated according to Cherktow, Bub, and Seidenberg (1989) as the priming effect (the difference between test and control RTs) divided by the control mean.
10 One of the reviewers asked whether the priming effects for normal controls varied as a function of educational level. Although not reported in detail here, we looked at priming effects as a function of educational level and found no differences. 11 We also carried out an ANOVA on a set of concrete words with concreteness ratings that were all above 500 and found the same pattern of results as for the entire set of words; i.e., a significant priming effect, F 2 (i, 58) = 42.62,p < .001, and slightly more priming for the concrete than abstract words.
12 J.G. made 3.4% lexical decision errors on concrete words and 8.0% on abstract words. 13 We analyzed 97% of the concrete word data and 89% of the abstract word data. primes compared with 859 ms when targets followed unrelated control words. There was also a significant interaction between priming (test vs. control) and association (± Association) because there was more priming for word pairs that were not associatively related (170 ms) than for pairs that were highly associated; 83 ms; F t (l, 71) = 5.87,p = .018. Although we are not yet sure what underlies this effect, the important point is that it is the same for abstract as well as concrete words (see Table 4 ), with a 90-ms reduction for the (+A + S) concrete words and an 85-ms reduction for the (+A + S) abstract words. We mention this further in the Discussion section below. J.G. showed the same pattern of priming for both concrete and abstract words; the type (abstract-concrete) by priming (test-control) and association (±Association) interaction was not significant, Fi(l, 71) = 0, p = .987. Moreover, like the controls, amount of priming did not correlate with degree of concreteness for the concrete set (r = .0151,p = .9254).
J.G. also showed the normal pattern of more priming for concrete (176 ms) than for abstract (76 ms) words, Fj(l, 71) = 7.48, p = .008. However, when we look at the proportion of priming we see that he shows more priming than normal for the concrete pairs; the proportion of priming is outside the normal range for both types of concrete pairs; (+A + S): 16%; (-A + S): 23%. It is not clear that this constitutes an instance of hyperpriming (Cherktow, Bub, & Seidenberg, 1989) , which is usually considered to be revealed in abnormally slow RTs in the control condition. J.G.'s control RTs for the concrete words (804 and 946 ms) are well within the normal range (810-1063 ms). For the abstract pairs, J.G.'s priming effect is much more like the normal controls'; it is only marginally outside the normal range for the (-A + S) condition and within the normal range for the (+A + S) pairs.
Of D.E.'s data 13.6% consisted of errors or timeouts (over 3 s).
14 These and the corresponding data points were removed from the analysis;' 5 4.8% were extreme values (i.e., they exceeded 2 SDs from the mean) and were replaced by the cutoff value (M ± 2 SDs). D.E.'s data were entered into an ANOVA. The means for the four conditions are given in Table  5 , which shows that D.E.'s lexical decision latencies are within the normal range.
D.E. showed an overall effect of priming, Fi(l, 57) = 11.5, p = .001, with lexical decision latencies being faster when the target was preceded by a related prime (884 ms) compared with an unrelated prime (989 ms). There were no significant interactions. Although there was only a 24-ms priming effect for the concrete pairs that were associatively and semantically related, this was not significantly different from the priming effects in the other conditions either in an ANOVA that included all four conditions, Fj(l, 57) = 0.955,p = .33, or in an ANOVA on the concrete items only, F,(l, 30) = 2.9,p = .0982. There was a tendency, very marked in the concrete set, toward less priming when the word pairs were both semantically and associatively related, just as for J.G. We mention the implications of this in the Discussion section. Finally, the proportion of priming for all conditions was just on the limits of the normal range.
We also carried out a correlational analysis to see whether D.E. showed more priming for concrete words as a function of their concreteness rating. Just as for J.G. and the controls, the correlation between concreteness and priming was not significant (r = .02, p = .89). D.E.'s priming data is similar, although not identical in all of its details to J.G.'s. He shows priming for both abstract and concrete words and no statistical differences between them in the patterns of priming obtained.
Definition Study
The controls were able to define almost all of the abstract (1 participant failed to define the abstract word declare) and all of the concrete words. However, they clearly had more difficulty generating definitions for abstract than concrete words and, in general, produced fewer pieces of information for abstract than concrete words.
D.E. and J.G. were surprisingly good at generating definitions for both abstract and concrete words in that they were almost always able to produce some semantic information that indicated that they knew the meaning of the word. J.G. was unable to define only one out of the 22 abstract words (inhabit); D.E. was unable to define four abstract words (usual, power, demand, and inhabit) .
The important issue is how the quality of their definitions compared with those given by the control participants. 16 In some obvious ways, the patients' definitions differed from normal; they were less fluent and function words were missingall characteristics of nonfluent, agrammatic speech. In addition, their definitions tended to involve more anecdotal or context-specific aspects of a word's meaning rather than general defining properties. They rarely produced superordinates as part of their definition, but this was the same for abstract and concrete words. 14 D.E. made 12.6% lexical decision errors in the concrete word set and 14.8 in the abstract word set. He made lexical decision errors on both the test and control versions of two concrete words (rent and exam) and three abstract words (proclaim, cause, and resign) . 15 We used 78% of the concrete word data and 71% of the abstract word data in the analysis. 16 We looked at whether educational level affects the types of definitions that participants produce and found that it was the form, rather than the content, that varied as a function of educational level.
For example, when the elderly controls denned the abstract word temper, they produced definitions such as "a mood of anger or frustration," "emotion of anger," and "this can be awful when lost-most people lose it occasionally." They usually included a superordinate (such as emotion, mood, or frame of mind). D.E. produced a very similar definition: "very angry, half and half at work, temper sometimes," and J.G. said "anger." Both patients gave the response "angry," which is the most popular piece of information for controls, but they did not give a superordinate.
Similarly, the abstract word courage was defined by controls as "to show bravery in the face of danger" and "we all need courage-I wish I had some." D.E. defined courage as "on telly, accident and things like that, courage, ring up 999, conscious one side and leave it and ring up"; J.G. defined it as "medal, valiant, not in England, Rommel." Once again, the patients defined the word in terms of a specific example or context-what you get medals for in the war or what you do when you dial 999 in an accident. This was different from the definitions of the majority of the controls, who usually gave some kind of synonym-usually bravery, and mentioned general dangers or problems rather than specific instances. However, there is some overlap between patients and controls; J.G. gave one near-synonym (valiant), and at least 1 control participant gave only an anecdotal response. The important point is that although D.E. and J.G.'s definitions are not exactly the same as normal individuals, they left no doubt that they knew what courage means. 17 Importantly, the patients' definitions of abstract words were very similar in style to their definitions of concrete words, although like normal controls, they produced less information about abstract than concrete words. For example, J.G. defined the concrete word cow as "OK, but the dung is ughh!-milk;" oven as "the meat and all that-all lovely and bubbly"; restaurant as "Christmas and the hotel is packed at Christmas and parties and everything." Similarly, D.E. defined restaurant as "two weeks ago, restaurant, book up, inside restaurant, eat, wine, afters"; oven as "at home, inside over, bottom over lift out all black inside, roast pork, beef, chicken, yorkshire pudding"; and king as "hope so, later on king-Prince Charlesqueen." The patients' concrete word definitions were similar to their definitions of abstract words; they tended to produce anecdotal information and rarely produced a superordinate.
D.E. and J.G.'s definitions provided ample evidence that they had a lot of retained information about the meanings of abstract words. The way in which their definitions differed from normal individuals is that they tended not to give superordinate information about a word and they made more use of personally relevant context-specific information. However, these differences from the normal pattern held for both abstract and concrete words. There is little evidence from these data of a specific impairment in the central semantic representation of abstract words.
Discussion
In the semantic priming task, J.G. and D.E. produced lexical decision latencies within the normal range and significant priming for both abstract and concrete words. These data suggest that both patients access semantic representations normally. Thus, they do not conform to some of the recent descriptions of nonfluent, Broca patients as accessing semantic information more slowly than normal (Milberg, Blumstein, & Dworetzky, 1987; Prather, Shapiro, Zurif, & Swinney, 1991). 18 In general, the pattern of priming for both patients, across all of the experimental conditions, was similar for both abstract and concrete words. This was even the case on those occasions when the patients produced an abnormal priming pattern-as with the word pairs that were both semantically and associatively related. These pairs produced less priming for the patients than the pairs that were only semantically related. In contrast, the controls showed similar amounts of priming for the two types of words (± Associated). One possible explanation for this finding is that it reflects interference effects between highly related word pairs. In our experiment, the semantically related pairs were all near synonyms. This, coupled with the fact that the pairs were also highly associated in the +A + S condition, may have resulted in inhibition between highly activated competitors. This explanation is speculative, but we are carrying out further studies to investigate it in more detail. Notwithstanding this difference from the normal pattern, the important point is that J.G. and D.E. showed the same pattern of priming effects for both the abstract and concrete words.
But can we conclude from the priming data alone that the semantic representations of abstract words are unimpaired? Rapp and Caramazza (1993) argued that such a claim cannot be made. They have claimed that it is not possible to argue for intact semantic representations on the basis of priming data because priming can be supported by degraded representations. We have outlined elsewhere our general objections to this claim (Moss & Tyler, 1994) ; in the present context, our interpretation of the priming data is supported by the definitions that the patients produce. These do not give any hint that the representation of abstract words is impoverished relative to that for concrete words.
General Difficulty With Abstract Words
The priming and definition data suggest that D.E. and J.G. have a considerable amount of retained information about the meaning of abstract words. How do we reconcile these data with the fact that both patients showed worse performance on abstract than concrete words in a variety of other tasks?
In the introduction, we described their poor performance on the Shallice and McGill (personal communication, 1978) word-picture matching task. When compared with the mean of the control group, the patients' performance seemed consider- 17 To underscore this point, we provide a few more examples of the patients' definitions of abstract words. For J.G., risk: a gamble; plead: starving children; and crave: I used to, an ounce of Golden Virginia, but given up. For D.E., kind: generous, hope so like children; order: order sandwich, dinner, food; and crave: me, chocolate biscuits, different people, different things. 18 We have presented evidence and arguments against the slow activation hypothesis as an account of the deficit in Broca's aphasia in a recent article (Tyler, Ostrin, Cooke, & Moss, 1995) so will not review them here.
ably worse than that of the controls. Then we pointed out that some of our controls in fact had similar degrees of difficulty selecting the correct picture to match an abstract word.
The patients also performed poorly when they were asked to make semantic relatedness judgments on the same word pairs that we used in the priming study. D.E. made 13% errors on the concrete words and 31% errors on the abstract words. J.G.'s results were similar to D.E.'s: 9% on concrete words and 33% on abstract words. At first glance, these data also seem to show that the patients have a selective impairment for abstract words. However, once again, when we compare the patients with the range of scores produced by a control group, we find that some of the controls perform as badly as the patients. The control group consisted of 7 elderly men and women who were education-matched to the patients. 19 Their errors ranged from 0-16% on concrete words and from 0-34% on abstract words.
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Although the patients performed more poorly than the controls taken as a group, almost all-whether controls or patients-are less accurate with abstract than with concrete words. These data do not provide compelling evidence that the patients' representation of abstract words is seriously impaired because we would also have to draw the same conclusion about some of the controls. A more reasonable interpretation of the data is that they indicate that it is particularly difficult to make semantic relatedness judgments about abstract words. Thus, when someone makes errors when judging the semantic relatedness of abstract words, this does not necessarily imply that the semantic representations on which those judgments are based are impaired.
The control data from the word-picture matching task, the relatedness judgments, and the definitions task all suggest that the meanings of abstract words are inherently more difficult to retrieve or use by unimpaired controls in tasks that require some degree of metalinguistic awareness. Even in the definitions task, controls consistently produce less information about an abstract word than a concrete word. In fact, this general pattern is consistent with previous work that shows that unimpaired participants have more difficulty with abstract than concrete words in a variety of tasks (Pavio, 1991; Schwanenflugel, 1991) .
One possible explanation for this difficulty stems from some recent work by Plaut and Shallice (1993) . They have proposed that abstract words have less "rich" semantic representations than concrete words. What they meant by this is that the representations of abstract words contain fewer semantic features than those of concrete words. On this type of account, we might expect that when an abstract word is encountered, its semantic representation is less highly activated than a concrete word because fewer features are activated (Masson, 1991) . The activation of fewer features might in turn result in less overall activation of semanticalry related words. The net result would be poorer performance on tasks involving abstract wordswhich is exactly what we find. Even in the priming task, which is assumed to probe the automatic activation of semantic information, we see less priming for abstract than concrete words.
If the semantic representations of abstract words are in general less highly activated and therefore more difficult for controls to retrieve and use, it is difficult to infer from the poor performance of aphasic patients (as long as it remains within the normal range) that they have impaired representations of abstract words.
Normal Representation of Abstract Words
Can we conclude then that the semantic representations of abstract words are unimpaired in these patients? The weight of the evidence suggests that they are. In four different tasks, we found that the patients' performance was within the normal range; in the priming task, the Shallice-McGill (personal communication, 1978) word-picture matching task, the semantic relatedness task, and the definitions task. In all of these cases, the patients' had more difficulty with abstract than concrete words, but so did the controls. And, importantly, the patient data are within the range of the normal controls. Thus, we can conclude that for J.G. and D.E. the semantic representations of abstract words were considerably more intact than we would have supposed on the standard account of aphasic deficits-especially of aphasic patients like J.G. and D.E. who have large left hemisphere lesions.
Reading and Abstract Words
However, there is one domain in which J.G. and D.E. are clearly impaired with respect to abstract words; they are unable to read them. They each make significantly more errors reading abstract than concrete words, and their percentage of errors is considerably outside the normal range. Thus, when the patients responded to words presented in the auditory modality (as in the word-picture matching task and semantic judgments task mentioned earlier), they experienced the same kinds of difficulties as controls. But when the stimuli were presented in the visual modality, they exhibited a problem that was not shown by the controls. The question is whether this reading disorder reflects a modality-specific access impairment for abstract words presented in the visual modality or whether it is a more specific deficit associated with the task of reading aloud.
To investigate this issue, we recently carried out a visual priming study analagous to the auditory priming study described earlier. Because it was necessary to use words with regular spelling-sound patterns in the visual priming study, we could use only a subset of the words used in the original auditory priming study because many of these words were irregular. In all other respects, the two studies were comparable. Normal participants produced the same pattern of priming effects in the visual and auditory priming experiments, although the size of these effects was smaller in the visual than the auditory study. The patients also showed the same pattern of effects in the two studies with RTs comparable with normal effects. However, like for the normal controls, the size of the effects were smaller in the visual than in the auditory domain. D.E. showed priming for both abstract and concrete words, as revealed in an ANOVA that produced a main effect of priming, F(l, 59) = 5.17, p < .05, and no significant interactions. Similarly for J.G. there was a main effect of priming, F(l, 63) = 15.07, p < .01, and no interactions. Thus, both both abstract and concrete words primed.
The visual priming data suggest that D.E.'s and J.G.'s abstract word reading problems are confined to reading abstract words aloud. Their ability to activate the semantic representations of abstract words by the visual modality and the semantic representations themselves do not seem to be severely impaired. Why do these patients have more problems in reading aloud abstract than concrete words? One possibility is that they have a general impairment in the mapping from semantics to phonology, resulting in an overall difficulty in reading words aloud. This is supported by the fact that both patients are rarely perfect in reading aloud concrete words, although their concrete word reading is substantially better than their abstract word reading. But why should this general impairment impact abstract words more than concrete words? Our explanation is based on Plaut and Shallice's (1993) account of the differences between the semantic representations of abstract and concrete words. They claimed that abstract words have less rich semantic representations than concrete words. In a series of lesioning experiments to determine the effects of different types of lesions on the kinds of errors the model makes, they found that lesioning the input orthographic connections to semantics affected abstract words more than it affected concrete words. By analogy, lesions in the mapping from semantics to phonology may lead to more errors in reading aloud abstract than concrete words when the semantics of both are unimpaired.
Abstract Words and the Right Hemisphere
Finally, the data we have presented here for J.G. allowed us to draw some tentative conclusions about hemispheric differences in the representation of the meaning of abstract and concrete words. As we mentioned earlier, PET scans of J.G. (Hinton, Plaut, & Shallice, 1993) revealed no detectable activation in the left hemisphere, suggesting that his language processing is being carried out by the right hemisphere. Indeed, our previous studies with J.G. (Ostrin & Tyler, in press ) reveal a pattern of results that is compatible with the picture that has been developed of the right hemisphere's capacity for language (Dennis, 1980; Gazzaniga & Hillyard, 1971; Zaidel, 1978) ; the only linguistic knowledge that appears to be represented in the right hemisphere is the meanings of individual words; phonological and syntactic abilities are minimal. In a number of studies with J.G., we found a picture that is very similar to this description of the capacities of the right hemisphere. He showed normal semantic priming for a range of different kinds of semantic relations for concrete words, but no evidence that he can process words when they occur in sentences; he was insensitive to a range of syntactic and morphological manipulations (Ostrin & Tyler, 1995) .
Although the results of these previous studies are compatible with current views on the language capacities of the right hemisphere, the data we have reported in this article for abstract words are not. It has been claimed that the meaning of concrete words are represented in both the right and left hemispheres (Day, 1977) , and the fact that J.G. produced significant priming for concrete words is compatible with this. However, it has also been claimed that abstract words are only represented in the left hemisphere (Moscovitch, 1983) . On this account, because J.G. does not have a functioning left hemisphere and his language processing is due to right hemisphere function, he should not be able to process the meaning of an abstract word. However, as we have shown here, the representation of abstract words appears to be as intact as the representation of concrete words.
21 Thus, J.G.'s data is more compatible with the view that both abstract and concrete words are represented in both hemispheres (Chairello, Senehi, & Nuding, 1987) .
Summary
We have presented data from 2 nonfluent aphasic patients who in a variety of tasks show patterns of performance on abstract and concrete words that are within the normal range. These data suggest that the representation of both types of words is not seriously or differentially impaired. However, the patients do have a significant problem reading words aloud, which is more profound for abstract than concrete words.
An important aspect of the interpretation of these data rests on the assumption that we have to compare the individual patient's performance against the range of the control group, particularly in those tasks that require controlled access to semantic representations (word-picture matching, relatedness judgments, and definitions). This is necessary because of the variability in the performance of the control group on abstract words. Some controls show very little difficulty with abstract words, but others show considerable difficulty. In other studies not reported here, we have also found that the educational level of participants greatly influences their ability to deal with abstract words in some tasks (e.g., semantic relatedness judgments); participants who have been educated to tertiary level rarely have problems, whereas those who have only received a few years of schooling often have problems. In contrast, performance on concrete words does not seem to be affected by educational level to the same extent, nor is there the same degree of variability across participants. Thus, if we compare each patient's performance against the control group mean, this will tend to overestimate the severity of their impairment; their performance on abstract (and occasionally concrete) words is generally worse than that of the control group mean. However, if we compare their performance to that of the range of scores produced by the controls, it looks normal.
In contrast to the range of normal behavior in these tasks that require controlled, effortful processing, controls perform much more consistently in the priming study; nor does educational level seem to affect priming performance. It may be the case that a task like this, which taps the automatic activation of semantic information, is better suited for providing robust normative data against which the patient performance can be evaluated.
Finally, we have also drawn attention to the fact that J.G. presents a counterexample to the claim that abstract words are only represented in the left hemisphere. Because his left hemisphere is nonfunctional, the meaning of abstract words must be represented in his right hemisphere, along with concrete words.
